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BLACK SNAKE ON THE PERIPHERY: THE DAKOTA ACCESS
PIPELINE AND TRIBAL JURISDICTIONAL SOVEREIGNTY
ANDREW ROME*

ABSTRACT
“[W]hen one strips away the convoluted statutes, the technical legal
complexities, the elaborate collateral proceedings, and the layers upon layers of interrelated orders and opinions from this Court . . . what remains is
the raw, shocking, humiliating truth at the bottom: After all of these years,
our government still treats Native American Indians as if they were somehow less than deserving of the respect that should be afforded to everyone
in a society where all people are supposed to be equal.”1

*† JD Vermont Law School. Thank you to Morgan, Harper, and Warren. A big thank you
to Professor Hillary Hoffmann for taking the time to meet with me and formulate this Article, and
for providing feedback on the initial draft. And thank you to the editorial staff of the NORTH
DAKOTA LAW REVIEW.
1. Cobell v. Norton, 229 F.R.D. 5, 7 (D.D.C. 2005), vacated, 455 F.3d 317 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

58

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 93:1

I.

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................ 58

II.

THE MODERN HISTORY AND TREATY RIGHTS OF THE
STANDING ROCK SIOUX TRIBE ................................................ 63

III.

THE HISTORY AND CURRENT STATE OF TRIBAL CIVIL
JURISDICTION ............................................................................... 69
A. TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY PRE-MONTANA ....................................... 69
B. MONTANA AND ITS EFFECT ON TRIBAL CIVIL JURISDICTION ...... 74
1. Civil Regulatory versus Adjudicative Jurisdiction ..............75
2. Interpretation of Montana’s Second Exception ...................76
3. The Importance of Land .......................................................79

IV.

PATHS FOR TRIBAL JURISDICTION OVER THE DAPL ......... 81
A. LANDS TO THE NORTH ............................................................... 82
B. LAKE OAHE ................................................................................ 83

V.

I.

CONCLUSION ................................................................................. 86

INTRODUCTION

The Lakota2 had prophesied this: a great and evil black snake would
someday descend and reap destruction, rendering their homeland uninhabitable to hunt and fish and their waters unsuitable for religious ceremony.3
The black snake would disrupt the Lakota’s sacred connection to their
land.4
Now that prophesy may become a reality in the form of the Dakota Access Pipeline (“DAPL”), operated by Dakota Access, LLC (a subsidiary of
Energy Transfer Crude Oil Company, LLC).5 If allowed to proceed, the

2. Lakota
Indians,
INDIANS.ORG,
(last
visited
May
8,
2017),
http://www.indians.org/articles/lakota-indians.html. The term “Lakota” refers to the cluster of
tribes—including the Standing Rock Sioux and Cheyenne River Sioux Tribes—located in North
and South Dakota. This Article focuses on the rights of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, a federally
recognized tribe and a direct lineage of the Great Sioux Nation. Plaintiff Standing Rock Sioux
Tribe’s Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 2, Standing Rock
Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 239 F.Supp.3d 77 (D.D.C. 2017) (No. 1:16–cv–1534–
JEB), [hereinafter Standing Rock Sioux Tribe’s Motion for Summary Judgment].
3. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 239 F.Supp.3d at 82.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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DAPL will span roughly 1100 miles from North Dakota to Illinois,6 and
will transport approximately half-a-million barrels of crude oil per day.7 As
currently planned, it will cross the bed of Lake Oahe, a portion of the Missouri River a half-mile upstream from the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe Reservation in North Dakota.8 The DAPL has, unsurprisingly, sparked outrage
from both the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe and the international human
rights community. A protest site at the Cannonball River in North Dakota
became emblematic of this resistance.9
In July 2016, as part of the effort to block or re-route the DAPL, the
Standing Rock and the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribes brought an action in
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.10 This ongoing suit attempts to enjoin the Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) from
granting the DAPL an easement to cross Lake Oahe.11 The Tribes allege
the Lake Oahe crossing will result in treaty rights violations, religious infringement, and environmental degradation in violation of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA); the Clean Water Act (CWA); and the National Environmental Preservation Act (NEPA).12 In addition, the Tribes
brought a later claim under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act

6. Memorandum from Hilary C. Tompkins, Solicitor, United States Dep’t of the Interior, to
Sec’y, United States Dep’t of the Interior (Dec. 4, 2016) (on file with author) [hereinafter MOpinion].
7. Gabrielle Regney & Hillary Hoffmann, Vermont Law Top 10 Environmental Watch List
2017: Dakota Access Pipeline: The Calm Between the Storms, VT. J. ENVTL. L.,
http://vjel.vermontlaw.edu/topten/dakota-access-pipeline-calm-storms/ (last visited May 5, 2017).
8. M-Opinion, (Dec. 4, 2016) (on file with author). In addition, the DAPL will cross seventy
miles upstream from the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation. Id. For an excellent visual of the
DAPL route, and its proximity to the Standing Rock and Cheyenne River Reservations, see Gregor Aisch & K.K. Rebecca Lai, The Conflicts Along 1,172 Miles of the Dakota Access Pipeline,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/11/23/us/dakota-accesspipeline-protest-map.html?_r=0.
9. Mitch Smith, Standing Rock Protest Camp, Once Home to Thousands, is Razed, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/23/us/standing-rock-protest-dakotaaccess-pipeline.html.
10. Complaint, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 205
F.Supp.3d 4 (D.D.C. 2016) (No. 1:16-cv-01534), 2016 WL 4734356. [Hereinafter Standing Rock
Sioux’s Complaint].
11. Interestingly, and somewhat surprisingly, almost the entirety of the DAPL requires no
federal permitting as ninety-nine percent of its proposed route crosses privately held land. But because the DAPL crosses Lake Oahe, a federally regulated water, the Army Corps of Engineers
must permit this crossing. Samantha L. Varsalona, Pipelines, Protests, and General Permits,
GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 1 (Oct. 28, 2016), https://gelr.org/2016/10/28/pipelines-protestsand-general-permits/; see also Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 239 F.Supp.3d at 82. The Corps conducts this review under § 14 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 408, and § 185 of
the Mineral Leasing Act. 30 U.S.C. § 185. See also M-Opinion at 1.
12. Standing Rock Sioux’s Complaint, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 205 F.Supp.3d 4 (No.
1:16-CB-01534).
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(RFRA)13 due to the DAPL’s potential to damage religious artifacts in Lake
Oahe.14 They argue that an “oil spill affecting Lake Oahe would pose an
existential threat to the Tribe’s rights, culture, and welfare, and would fundamentally undermine its Treaty-protected rights to the integrity of its
homelands and the waters that sustain the Tribe.”15
Although the court denied a preliminary injunction in September
2016,16 the Corps recognized the need to assess the potential impact on treaty rights, and stated that it would withhold an easement until the conclusion
of this assessment.17 In December 2016, the Corps promised that it would
prepare an environmental impact statement to address oil spill risks, tribal
treaty rights in and around Lake Oahe, and possible alternative pipeline
routes.18 However, after his inauguration in January 2017, one of President
Trump’s first orders of business was to sign an executive order approving
the DAPL Lake Oahe crossing.19 Subsequent to the executive order, and
despite its prior assurances of a new environmental impact statement, the
Corps determined that its prior assessments “satisfied the NEPA requirements for evaluating the easement required for the DAPL to cross Corpsmanaged federal lands at Lake Oahe and supported a decision to grant an
easement.”20 The Corps thus granted the easement, and in June 2017, the
DAPL was completed.21 Soon after, the court granted in part Standing
Rock’s motion for partial summary judgment, concluding that while the
Corps “substantially complied with NEPA in many areas . . . it did not adequately consider the impacts of an oil spill on fishing rights, hunting rights,
or environmental justice, or the degree to which the pipeline’s effects are
likely to be highly controversial.”22 The court ordered the Corps to “reconsider those sections of its environmental analysis” and requested the parties

13. Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4
(1993). et seq.
14. See generally Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, No. 16–
1534, 2017 WL 908538 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2017) (denying Tribe’s motion for preliminary injunction).
15. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 1.
16. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 16-1534 (JEB),
2016 WL 4734356, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 9, 2016).
17. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 1.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1–2.
20. Standing Rock Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 16–1534 (JEB), 2017 WL
2573994, at *7 (D.D.C. June 14, 2017).
21. Id.
22. Id. at *1.
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submit “further briefing” on whether pipeline operations can continue during such time.23 The case continues to play out in federal court.
But if the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe (“Standing Rock Tribe”) had attempted to assert its own civil jurisdictional authority over the DAPL—
either regulatory or adjudicative—what would the result have been? If the
DAPL produces civil claims in the future, can the Standing Rock Tribal
Court hear them? If left simply to the Standing Rock Tribe, there would be
no question. According to the Standing Rock Tribal Code of Justice, the
Standing Rock Tribe retains civil jurisdiction over:
(a) All cases in law and equity arising under the Tribal Constitution, Tribal custom and tradition, or the laws of the Tribe as set
forth in the Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Code of Justice or properly-adopted regulation or policy of the Tribe; and/or (b) to any case
in which the Tribe, a member of the Tribe, and Indian residing on
the reservation or a corporation or entity owned in whole or in
substantial part by any Indian shall be a party.24
Per its Code, the Standing Rock Tribe would have jurisdiction over the
DAPL just by virtue of the Tribe, or a member of the Tribe, being a party.
This Article attempts to explore whether United States federal courts
would recognize this same jurisdictional right.25 The analysis focuses on
two key issues, prevalent in any tribal jurisdiction claim: (1) land—i.e.,
whether the cause of action occurred in “Indian Country,”26 and (2) membership—i.e., whether one party is a non-member of the tribe. As explored

23. Id.
24. Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Code of Justice, tit. 1, ch. 1, § 1–107.
25. From this point forward, when this Article discusses the Tribe’s ability to assert jurisdiction, it refers to jurisdiction that a federal court would recognize—bearing in mind that tribes often
do not seek guidance from the federal judiciary in recognizing their own civil jurisdiction.
26. “Indian Country” is shorthand for the territory upon which a tribe may assert its own
criminal or civil jurisdiction. The parameters of Indian Country are found in 18 U.S.C. § 1151.
See DeCoteau v. Dist. Cty. Court for Tenth Judicial Dist., 420 U.S. 425, 428 n.2 (1975) (“While §
1151 is concerned, on its face, only with criminal jurisdiction, the Court has recognized that it
generally applies as well to questions of civil jurisdiction.”). Under § 1151, tribes may assert jurisdiction if the cause of action falls on (1) a reservation, (2) federal trust allotments, or (3) land
that is part of a “dependent Indian Community.” Id.; see also Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie,
522 U.S. 520, 528 (1998). In short, tribes lose any possibility of federal recognition of jurisdiction
for causes of action that occur on lands outside the three categories in § 1151. See Philip Morris
USA, Inc. v. King Mountain Tobacco Co., 569 F.3d 932, 938 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[T]ribal jurisdiction is, of course, cabined by geography: The jurisdiction of tribal courts does not extend beyond
tribal boundaries.”) (citing Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 658 n. 12 (2001)).
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more fully below, both are critical issues in determining federal recognition
of tribal jurisdiction to regulate behavior or redress a particular civil wrong.
Tribal legal jurisdiction is important in a number of respects. To begin,
there are the routine advantageous and disadvantages attendant in most forum decisions. Assuming the court in question can meet the venue requirements—e.g., personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction—the
initial choice of forum belongs to the plaintiff.27 This decision often involves weighing such things as convenience of location and the plaintiff’s
“home-court” advantage of being in a friendly jurisdiction around likeminded peers who may sit on a jury.28
Yet, when it comes to tribal jurisdiction, something much deeper is at
stake: sovereignty. A tribe’s right to assert legal jurisdiction over that
which affects its people or land forms a fundamental precept of sovereignty.29 Here, the stakes include jurisdiction over an oil pipeline that will have
a large impact on the people and land within Sioux territory, and a commodity that accounts for much of the Native American economy.30 This
case truly represents a struggle for control over important issues with direct
bearing on tribal land; it demonstrates the adage that tribal sovereignty
equates to tribal identity.31 Unfortunately, over the last forty years, the
27. A. BENJAMIN SPENCER, CIVIL PROCEDURE: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 281 (4th ed.
2014).
28. See Kimberly Jade Norwood, Shopping for A Venue: The Need for More Limits on
Choice, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 267, 272 (1996) (“In making the where-to-file decision, the lawyer—normally the plaintiff’s lawyer, because the plaintiff normally is the filing party—takes
many factors into account.”).
29. See, e.g., Lisa M. Slepnikoff, More Questions than Answers: Plains Commerce Bank v.
Long Family Land and Cattle Company, Inc. and the U.S. Supreme Court’s Failure to Define the
Extent of Tribal Authority over Nonmembers on Non-Indian Land, 54 S. D. L. REV. 460, 461
(2009) (“Since the issue of tribal sovereignty was first addressed in 1832 by Chief Justice John
Marshall, tribes have been recognized to possess the powers of inherent sovereignty over their
land and people.”); see also Robert B. Porter, Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty through Government Reform: What are the Issues?, in SOVEREIGNTY, COLONIALISM AND THE INDIGENOUS
NATIONS: A READER 55, 55 (Robert Odawi Porter ed., 2005) (“Tribal sovereignty is dependent
upon three things: (i) the degree to which Indians believe in the right to define their own future;
(ii) the degree to which Indians have the power to carry out their beliefs, and (iii) the degree to
which tribal sovereign acts are recognized both within the tribe and the outside world”).
30. See Native American Lands and Natural Resource Development, NATURAL RESOURCE
GOVERNANCE
INSTITUTE
(2011),
http://www.resourcegovernance.org/analysistools/publications/native-american-lands-and-natural-resource-development (noting “American
Indian lands are estimated to include . . . up to 20 percent of the [United States’] known natural
gas and oil reserves”); see also Indian Country Demographics, NATIONAL CONGRESS OF
AMERICAN INDIANS (last visited Apr. 8, 2017); see also NATIONAL CONGRESS OF AMERICAN
INDIANS, http://www.ncai.org/about-tribes/demographics (explaining “undeveloped reserves of
coal, natural gas, and oil on tribal land could generate nearly $1 trillion in revenues for tribes and
surrounding communities.”).
31. Daan Braveman, Tribal Sovereignty: Them and Us, 82 OR. L. REV. 75, 77 (2003)
(“[D]ebates about tribal sovereignty quickly become debates about Indian identity.” (quoting Bar-
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United States Supreme Court has slowly eroded the scope of tribal legal jurisdiction.32 A shift back to greater tribal civil jurisdiction in the TwentyFirst Century will prove pivotal for tribal sovereignty.
Part II of this Article explores the history of the Standing Rock Tribe as
part of the Lakota People in the Dakotas, including a history of its land and
treaty rights. Part III parses the history of the United States’ recognition of
tribal civil jurisdiction, and the recent approach of federal courts to curtail
this jurisdiction. Part IV examines two possible routes for the Standing
Rock Tribe to achieve civil jurisdiction over the DAPL: (1) its Lake Oahe
crossing, and (2) its crossing through lands to the north of the current
Standing Rock Reservation, lands that the Standing Rock Tribe never actually ceded, but are now privately held. This Article concludes by noting
that, while the Standing Rock Tribe may find difficulty in asserting jurisdiction, the federal judiciary should reverse course and allow for greater tribal
sovereignty.
II. THE MODERN HISTORY AND TREATY RIGHTS OF THE
STANDING ROCK SIOUX TRIBE
Before any other discussion, it is important to consider the history of
the Standing Rock Tribe in the Dakota lands. This section will focus, in
particular, on events surrounding the Fort Laramie Treaties of 185133 and
1868,34 and thereafter. These treaties, and their aftermath, form the basis
for the Standing Rock Tribe’s modern land claims and the potential for jurisdiction over the DAPL.35
In the late 1700s, the Great Sioux Nation resided in what is present-day
Minnesota, and began to migrate west in search of buffalo, fanning out as
far west as Wyoming and as far south as Kansas.36 Despite these nomadic
hunting patterns, “the core area of the Sioux Nation was not in dispute.”37
Prior to the mid-1800s, the Great Sioux Nation’s territorial reign and economic development remained largely uninhibited by their white neigh-

bara Ann Atwood, Identity and Assimilation: Changing Definitions of Tribal Power over Children, 83 MINN. L. REV. 927, 937 (1999)).
32. See infra Part II.
33. 1851 Ft. Laramie Treaty, Sept. 17, 1851, 11 Stat. 749 [hereinafter 11 Stat. 749].
34. 1868 Ft. Laramie Treaty, April 29, 1868, 15 Stat. 635 [hereinafter 15 Stat. 635].
35. See supra Introduction n. 22 (discussing the tests for Indian Country); infra Part II
(same).
36. IMRE SUTTON, IRREDEEMABLE AMERICA: THE INDIANS’ ESTATE AND LAND CLAIMS
123-24 (Imre Sutton et al. eds., 1985).
37. Id. at 124.
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bors.38 However, the exploding American westward expansion brought emigrants with accompanying population pressures and new disease.39 The
Fort Laramie Treaties marked a transition for the Sioux’s relationship with
European settlers and the federal government.40 The Treaties “imposed European American ideas about property ownership on the landscape, and in
the process, they introduced a new dimension into Indian-White relationships that would profoundly affect the nature of tribal ties” to the Dakotas.41
In 1851, the federal government began negotiations at Fort Laramie,
Wyoming with a group of tribes representing the upper Missouri and Platte
River regions.42 The eventual treaty brokered a peace between these tribes,
and delineated a large mass of land for the Great Sioux Nation, including
much of the Dakota Territory.43 After the 1851 Treaty, the Sioux Territory
was bordered on the north by the Heart River (in what is now southern
North Dakota), and on the east by the Missouri River.44 Furthermore, the
United States agreed to “protect the [Sioux Nation] against commission of
all depredations by the people of the said United States.”45
The United States, however, quickly broke its promise of protection.
From 1851 through 1867, the Lakota became “unsettled about the growing
presence of emigrants and military commands in their shared territories.”46
Hostilities increased between the Sioux tribes, American soldiers, and region settlers.47 To quell this conflict, the United States and the tribes met
once again and formed the 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty.48 The Treaty established the Great Sioux Reservation, and drew its eastern boundary as the
eastern bank of the Missouri River; its southern boundary as the northern
border of Nebraska; its northern boundary as the “forty-sixth parallel of
38. PATRICIA C. ALBERS, THE HOME OF THE BISON: AN ETHNOGRAPHIC AND
ETHNOHISTORICAL STUDY OF TRADITIONAL CULTURAL AFFILIATIONS TO WIND CAVE
NATIONAL PARK 88 (2003).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 89.
43. 11 Stat. 749, art. 5.
44. Id. These lands include the current site of the DAPL crossing. See also Jeffery Ostler &
Nick Estes, ‘The Supreme Law of the Land’: Standing Rock and the Dakota Access Pipeline,
INDIAN
COUNTRY
MEDIA
NETWORK
(Jan.
16,
2017),
https://indiancountrymedianetwork.com/news/opinions/supreme-law-land-standing-rock-dakotaaccess-pipeline/. For the tribes, however, “the territorial boundaries drawn on the 1851 treaty map
were largely meaningless as local tribes continued to move across the landscape in complex ways
that encouraged the sharing of jointly held territories.” ALBERS, supra note 38, at 90.
45. 11 Stat. 749, art. 3.
46. ALBERS, supra note 38, at 96.
47. Id. at 99.
48. Id.
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north latitude;” and its western boundary as “the one hundred and fourth
meridian of west longitude, in addition to certain reservations already existing east of the Missouri.”49 The United States additionally agreed “that no
[unauthorized] person shall ever be permitted to pass over, settle upon, or
reside in the territory described in this article.”50 The Treaty guaranteed
hunting rights for large swaths of lands outside the reservation boundaries.51
And it stated that “lands north of the North Platte River and east of the
summits of the Big Horn mountains shall be held and considered to be unceded.”52 In 1978, the Indian Claims Commission found that these unceded
northern lands stretched to the Heart River—land that the DAPL is currently slated to cross.53 Finally, the Treaty stipulated, “no treaty for the cession
of any portion or part of the reservation . . . shall be [valid] . . . unless executed and signed by at least three-fourths of the adult male Indians occupying or interested in the same.”54
Shortly after ratification of the 1868 Treaty, white speculators found
gold in the Black Hills region of the Great Sioux Reservation.55 In 1874, in
order to confirm the presence of this gold, Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer led a 1000 strong military brigade through the Reservation
and into the Black Hills.56 Custer’s reports of gold, mineral, timber, and
fertile land became widely reported back east, and ignited new pressure to
open the Black Hills for white settlement.57 The Fort Laramie Treaty stood
in the way.58 So, in 1875, President Grant met privately with the Secretary

49. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 374-75 (1980); see also 15 Stat.
635, art. 2.
50. 15 Stat. 635, art. 2.
51. Id. at art. 11.
52. Id. at art. 16.
53. Ostler & Estes, supra note 44; see also SUTTON, supra note 36, at 122 (showing map of
“Sioux cessions and claims.”)
54. Ostler & Estes, supra note 44. Interestingly:
The [1868] Fort Laramie Treaty was considered by some commentators to have been a
complete victory for Red Cloud and the Sioux . . . it was described as the only instance in
the history of the United States where the government has gone to war and afterwards
negotiated a peace conceding everything demanded by the enemy and exacting nothing
in return.
Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. at 371, 376 n. 4.
55. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. at 376; ALBERS, supra note 38, at 120-21.
56. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. at 376-77.
57. Id. at 377.
58. Id; see also SUTTON, supra note 36, at 125 (“As settlement pushed west in Dakota Territory, the Great Sioux Reserve stood in the path of expansion . . . .”).
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of the Interior and the Secretary of War and declared that he would no longer protect the Black Hills from white intruders.59
During the following winter of 1876, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs notified Sioux hunting on the unceded northern lands that they must
return to the Reservation, or they would be classified as “hostile.”60 Due to
the severity of the winter conditions, the Sioux hunters could not comply.61
The United States Army attacked these “hostiles,” and the ensuing war led
to Custer’s defeat to Sitting Bull at the Battle of Little Big Horn the following June.62 But Sitting Bull’s victory was “short-lived, and those Indians
who surrendered to the Army were returned to the reservation, and deprived
of their weapons and horses, leaving them completely dependent for survival on rations provided them by the Government.”63
Congress quickly grew impatient with providing the Sioux with food
rations, so it passed a bill ending appropriations for subsistence.64 Additionally, Congress directed the President to form a commission for retrieving the Black Hills.65 In 1876, the commission arrived at the Great Sioux
Reservation and relayed to tribal leaders that the United States had abrogated its responsibility regarding the rations.66 The parties formed a new
agreement, in which the Sioux relinquished the Black Hills to the west and
unceded lands to the north.67 In return, the United States would continue to
provide rations.68 Notably, contrary to the express provision of the 1868
Fort Laramie Treaty, only ten percent of the adult male Sioux population
signed the 1876 Agreement.69 To that end, not only did the United States
use coercive tactics in cementing the agreement—i.e., threatening the Sioux
with starvation—it also violated previous treaty rights by failing to secure
the requisite signatures. Congress subsequently enacted the 1876 Agree-

59. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. at 378; see also ALBERS, supra note 38, at 123 (“In
1875, the military had largely abandoned its efforts to keep prospectors and settlers out of the
Black Hills, and even before this, they never prosecuted any of the trespassers.”).
60. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. at 379.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Act of Aug. 15, 1876, 19 Stat. 176.
65. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. at 381.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.; see also Ostler & Estes, supra note 44 (explaining that the 1876 Agreement purported to abrogate “the 1868 Article 16 unceded lands” to the north of the current Standing Rock Reservation).
69. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. at 381-82.
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ment into law,70 formally abrogating the 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty as it pertained to the aforementioned lands.71
The United States Supreme Court eventually held that the 1876 agreement was an unconstitutional taking and awarded the Sioux monetary compensation, but not an actual return of the land.72 In so holding, the Court
noted that “[a] more ripe and rank case of dishonorable dealings will never,
in all probability, be found in our history.”73 The Sioux have never accepted this monetary award, instead demanding “the return of the majority of
the Black Hills lands that are under federal ownership.”74
In 1889, during a national period of tribal land allotment,75 Congress
passed the Act of March 2, 1889.76 This Act “removed a substantial
amount of land from the [r]eservation and divided the remaining territory
into several smaller reservations for various Sioux bands, including the
Cheyenne River, Standing Rock, and Lower Brule.”77 The 1889 Act stipulated, however, that provisions of the Ft. Laramie Treaty that were “not in
conflict” remained.78 In addition, the Act delineated the “eastern border of
the Standing Rock, Cheyenne River, and Lower Brule Sioux Tribes as ‘the
center of the main channel of the Missouri River.’”79 The United States
70. Act of Feb. 28, 187, 19 Stat. 254 (1877).
71. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. at 382-83.
72. Id. at 424.
73. Id. at 388.
74. Ostler & Estes, supra note 44.
75. The allotment period, beginning with the General Allotment Act of 1887—also known as
the Dawes Act:
Grant[ed] each [tribal] family head 160 acres of land, 80 acres to each person over 18
years of age and to each orphan under 18, and grant[ed] all other single persons under
eighteen 40 acres of land. Generally, the land was held in trust for 25 years by the United States, with an unencumbered patent in fee issuing at the close of the trust period . . . The General Allotment Act provided that citizenship would be conferred on the
allottees at the conclusion of the trust process.
CAROLE E. GOLDBERG ET AL, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 26 (7th ed. 2015).
Although the general allotment period attempted to foster tribal independence over the
land, the federal government ended up pilfering massive amounts of land from the tribes:
Section 5 of the Act also contemplated that ‘surplus’ land, not needed for the fixedacreage allotment to tribal members, would be ceded to the federal government for compensation through negotiations with the tribe. Such lands were thereafter opened to nonIndian settlement under the public lands program; thus, Indian reservations were opened
to non-Indian settlement for the first time.
Id. From 1887 to 1934, the allotment era reduced tribal ownership of land from 138 million
acres to 48 million acres—a two-thirds reduction. Id. at 30.
76. 25 Stat. 888.
77. M-Opinion at 6.
78. Id. (citing South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 682 (1993)).
79. Id. (citing 25 Stat. 889).
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Supreme Court has interpreted statutory terms such as “center of the main
channel” as referring to “the middle of the main channel of a river.”80 As a
result, after the 1889 Act, the newly minted Standing Rock Sioux Tribe
Reservation’s eastern boarder extended to the middle of the Missouri River,
and what would eventually become Lake Oahe.
Lake Oahe was a direct result of the 1944 Flood Control Act,81 another
important event in the history of the Standing Rock Tribe. The Act created
a flood control plan for the Missouri River by, in part, creating dams to corral seasonal flooding.82 The Act “did not authorize the acquisition of Indian
property,” but subsequent statutes created “limited takings.”83 These statutes also recognized “the Tribes’ right to ‘hunt and fish in and around on
the aforesaid shoreline and reservoir created by the Acts, subject, however,
to regulations governing use by other citizens of the United States.’”84
Compensation for the land was “‘in settlement of all claims, rights,’ and
demands of the Tribe and individual Indians associated with the Act.”85
Moreover, the statutes took “title to any interest Indians may have in the
bed of the Missouri River so far as it is within the boundaries of the reservation at issue.”86
However, notwithstanding the Flood Control Act of 1944, the Standing
Rock Sioux Tribe Reservation continues to extend into the middle of Lake
Oahe. The 1889 Act and, as explored above, relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence establishes the eastern boundary of the Standing Rock Sioux
Tribe Reservation as the middle of the Missouri River. As the Department
of the Interior has explained, “a significant portion of Lake Oahe remains
within the outer boundary of the Standing Rock and Cheyenne River Sioux
Reservations.”87 This is so because the Flood Control Act of 1944, and

80. Id. at 7 (citing Iowa v. Illinois, 147 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1893)).
81. Pub. L. No. 78-534, 58 Stat. 887 (1944).
82. M-Opinion at 6. “These dams created huge lake-like reservoirs to control the Missouri
River’s seasonal flooding and to end periodic devastation caused downstream.” Id. (quoting Lower Brule Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 711 F.2d 809, 813 (8th Cir. 1983)). In a deeply sad twist of
irony, the Flood Control Act of 1944 actually created large flooding that displaced and devastated
many tribal families. See Hearing on Impact of the Flood Control Act of 1944 on Indian Tribes
along the Missouri River Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, United States Senate, 110th
Cong. First Session (Nov. 1, 2007) (Statement of Hon. Bryon L. Dorgan, Senator, North Dakota)
(“The loss of these lands has been devastating to the Indian communities. More than 900 Indian
families were relocated, but the fact is we have had entire communities inundated by water.”).
83. M-Opinion at 6 (quoting Lower Brule Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 711 F.2d 809, 813
(8th Cir. 1983)).
84. Id. (quoting 76 Stat. 701; 72 Stat. 1774; 72 Stat. 1764; 68 Stat. 1193).
85. Id. (quoting 72 Stat. 1173; 68 Stat. 1191).
86. Id. at 6–7 (quoting 76 Stat. 698; 72 Stat. 1762; 68 Stat. 1191).
87. Id. at 7.
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subsequent statutes, took land but ultimately did not reduce the size of the
Standing Rock and Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe Reservations.88 Consequently, the Standing Rock Tribe now has possible land connections to the
DAPL through: (1) unceded lands to the north of the Reservation, and (2)
Lake Oahe.
III. THE HISTORY AND CURRENT STATE OF TRIBAL CIVIL
JURISDICTION
The examination above of the Standing Rock Tribe’s history and ties to
land can help establish the parameters of “Indian country” necessary for any
jurisdictional claim. But whether a tribe can ultimately assert civil jurisdiction over a non-member warrants a close examination of federal caselaw.
As explored below, since Montana v. United States,89 federal recognition of
tribal civil jurisdiction over non-members has shrunk.90
A. TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY PRE-MONTANA
Any exploration of tribal sovereignty in post-Revolutionary War America must begin with the Marshall Trilogy, a series of Supreme Court decisions from 1823 to 1832, which provided the cornerstone for federal Indian
law. 91 Tribal sovereignty emerged from the Marshall Trilogy greatly diminished in many regards—the tribes certainly did not obtain absolute
recognition as a nation-state—but affirmed in others: the Marshall Court’s
explanation of tribal rights appears almost progressive next to the federal
jurisprudence and policy that would follow.
Tribes lost important rights under the Marshall Trilogy. The Court refused to recognize tribal ownership of territorial land in fee simple absolute,
applying the doctrine of discovery to explain that the land now belonged to

88. See id. (“[C]ourts have recognized that the Flood Control Act takings statutes did not
diminish their associated reservations.”).
89. Montana v. U.S., 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
90. See Lisa M. Slepnikoff, supra note 29, at 460 (noting that the Marshall Trilogy recognized tribal power “of inherent sovereignty over their territory and people,” but since the late
1970s, “the U.S. Supreme Court began to depart from traditional notions of tribal sovereignty”);
Joseph William Singer, Canons of Conquest: The Supreme Court’s Attack on Tribal Sovereignty,
37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 641, 643 (2003) (“Over the last twenty years, the Supreme Court has led a
massive assault on tribal sovereignty. Although it has acted to affirm expansive powers over tribal members, it has substantially curtailed tribal power over nonmembers . . . .”).
91. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831);
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
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the federal government.92 Moreover, the Court held, under Article III of the
Constitution, that tribes lacked any standing in federal court.93 But perhaps
the most indelible restriction on sovereignty came from the Court labeling
tribes as domestic dependent nations within the greater federal framework,
rather than independent nation-states within the United States’ geographic
boundary.94 The Court famously explained that tribes “[were] in a state of
pupilage” with “[t]heir relations to the Unites States resemble[ing] that of a
ward to his guardian.”95 This guardian-ward summation necessarily led to a
precipitous imbalance in the tribal/federal power dynamic.96
The Marshall Trilogy, however, also established some important tribal
rights. First, the Court held that, although tribes did not own their lands in
fee simple, they retained the rights of occupancy and exclusion.97 And
while tribal sovereignty existed within the larger federal framework, the
Court found that tribes retained the sovereign right of self-governance over
their territory—an inherent right that pre-dated the formation of the United
States.98 The Marshall Court cemented a lasting principal that tribes retain
these inherent powers, as long as the two sides did not terminate the power
through an agreement.99 The tribes also gained assured federal protection
against encroachment by state governments into tribal sovereignty or territory.100

92. See M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 574 (“[Tribal] power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to
whomever they pleased, was denied by the original fundamental principal, that discovery gave
exclusive title to those who made it.”).
93. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 20.
94. Id. at 17.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 574 (1823) (explaining that tribes are “the rightful occupants of
the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according to their
own discretion . . . .”). This right of exclusivity, however, was ultimately limited by federal control over the underlying land.
98. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 520 (1832) (“A weak state, in order to provide
for its safety, may place itself under the protection of one more powerful, without stripping itself
of the right of government, and ceasing to be a state.”).
99. See id. at 556-57 (noting that prior congressional acts “manifestly consider the several
Indian nations as distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their
authority is exclusive . . . .”); Braveman, supra note 31, at 83 (showing that the Marshall Court
“provided the foundation” for the principle “that the ‘powers of Indian tribes are, in general, inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished.’”) (quoting United
States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1978)).
100. See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 520 (“The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community,
occupying its own territory . . . in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of Congress.”).
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After the Marshall Court, the next wave of groundbreaking cases came
under the more conservative Court of the late Nineteenth Century. This era
ushered the “rise of federal plenary power” over tribal affairs, significantly
expanding federal control. 101 In United States v. Kagama, 102 for example,
the Court examined congressional power to establish duel federal-tribal jurisdiction over “major” crimes committed in Indian Country.103 The Court
determined that, while the Constitution contained no provision granting
Congress this authority, Congress derived the necessary authority from its
role as guardian.104 Aside from expanding the powers of the federal government, however, the Court largely left intact tribal legal jurisdiction over
their territories—assuming, of course, Congress did not intervene.105
Seventeen years later, in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, the Court expanded
congressional power further by finding that Congress held the unilateral
right to abrogate past treaties, if in the best interest of the United States.106
The Court explained that “[p]lenary authority over tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the power
has always been deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled by the
judicial department of the government.”107 The concept of congressional
plenary power over tribal affairs persists today.108
With the Twentieth Century came multiple important federal policy
shifts. First, the Allotment Era,109 which had spanned the late Nineteenth
through early Twentieth Century, ended in 1934 with the Indian Reorganization Act.110 The Indian Reorganization Act “reversed the allotment policy and sought to revitalize tribal government rather than destroying it.”111
However, in the 1940s, the federal government reversed course again and

101. GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 75, at 86.
102. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
103. Id. at 379.
104. Id. at 382.
105. See id. at 381-82 (“[Tribes] were, and always have been, regarded as having a semiindependent position when they preserved their tribal relations; not as states, not as nations, not as
possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty, but as a separate people, with the power of regulating their internal and social relations, and thus far not brought under the laws of the Union or of
the State within whose limits they resided.”).
106. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903).
107. Id. at 565.
108. See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 194 (2004) (explaining that “the Constitution, through the Indian Commerce and Treaty Clauses, grants Congress plenary and exclusive
powers to legislate in respect to Indian tribes”) (quoting Washington v. Confederated Bands and
Tribes of Yakima Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1979)).
109. See supra Part I n. 75 (exploring the Dawes Act).
110. Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934).
111. Singer, supra note 90, at 649-50.
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began a policy of terminating federal recognition of tribes, thereby severing—in many instances at least—the inter-governmental relationship between the federal government and federally recognized tribes.112 This policy proved brief and unsuccessful and, since 1960, the federal government
has officially “supported tribal sovereignty and affirmed the government-togovernment relationship existing between federally recognized tribes and
the United States.”113
During this period of transition, the Supreme Court decided Williams v.
Lee. 114 Lee featured a debt recovery claim in Arizona state court against
members of the Navajo Nation, brought by a non-tribal member who operated a business on the Navajo Reservation. The Court held that the Navajo
Nation, rather than Arizona, had jurisdiction by stating:
There can be no doubt that to allow the exercise of state jurisdiction here would undermine the authority of the tribal courts over
Reservation affairs and hence would infringe on the right of the
Indians to govern themselves. It is immaterial that respondent is
not an Indian. He was on the Reservation and the transaction with
the Indian took place there.115
The Court “reinforced the post-1934 Congressional policy of leaving the
governance of Indian country with Indian tribes, even when non-Indians
were involved.”116
However, only twenty years later, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe
signaled a new era of Supreme Court hesitancy in allowing tribal jurisdiction over non-members.117 Oliphant questioned the Suquamish Tribe’s
criminal jurisdiction over acts committed by non-Indians on tribal land.118
The Court eventually held that the Suquamish Tribe lacked jurisdiction,
even if the crime occurred on tribal land.119 Tribes, “by submitting to the
overriding sovereignty of the United States,” lost the “power to try non-

112. Id. at 650.
113. Id.
114. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
115. Id. at 223 (emphasis added).
116. Robert N. Clinton, There is no Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ.
ST. L. J. 113, 209 (2002).
117. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
118. Id. at 194.
119. Id. at 209.
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Indian citizens of the United States except in a manner acceptable to Congress.”120
Without explicitly stating, Oliphant reflected the Court’s general distrust of tribal courts. To reach its conclusion, Oliphant looked to Ex parte
Crow Dog—an 1883 case regarding federal criminal jurisdiction over tribal
members on tribal land—for the potential injustice in allowing tribal courts
to try non-Indians.121 It quoted Crow Dog for the proposition that tribal
courts try non-Indians “not by their peers, nor by the customs of their people, nor the law of their land, but by . . . a different race, according to the
law of a social state of which they have an imperfect conception.”122 That
Oliphant used this excerpt to justify restrictions on tribal jurisdiction is
shocking enough, but it gets worse. The Court omitted language from the
full quote that would have demonstrated its true discriminatory basis. Here
is the quote in full, in which Crow Dog examines problems with federal
criminal jurisdiction over tribal members:
It tries them not by their peers, nor by the customs of their people,
nor the law of their land, but by superiors of a different race, according to the law of a social state of which they have an imperfect
conception, and which is opposed to the traditions of their history,
to the habits of their lives, to the strongest prejudices of their savage nature; one which measures the red man’s revenge by the
maxims of the white man’s morality.123
Therefore, in relying on Crow Dog, the Oliphant opinion relays that
“just as it is unfair to subject ‘savages separated by race and tradition’ to the
law of the United States, it is unfair to subject non-Indians to the laws of
‘savage Indians.’”124 Oliphant’s fundamental distrust of tribal courts, and
the historic racism predicating this distrust, influenced Montana just two
years later, and continues to reverberate today.125
120. Id. at 210.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 210-11.
123. Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 571-72 (1883) (emphasis added).
124. Braveman, supra note 31, at 107.
125. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693 (1990) (“While modern tribal courts include
many familiar features of the judicial process, they are influenced by the unique customs, languages, and usages of the tribes they serve. Tribal courts are often subordinate to the political
branches of tribal governments, and their legal methods may depend on unspoken practices and
norms . . . .”) (citation and internal quotation marking omitted), holding superseded by 25 U.S.C.
§ 1301(2); Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 746 F.3d 167, 181 (5th Cir.
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B. MONTANA AND ITS EFFECT ON TRIBAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
In 1981, the Supreme Court decided Montana v. United States,126 now
regarded as “the pathmarking case concerning tribal civil authority over
nonmembers.”127 Montana examined the Crow Tribe of Montana’s regulation of non-member hunting and fishing within the Reservation.128 At the
onset, the Court explained that the Crow Tribe could regulate hunting and
fishing of non-members “on land belonging to the Tribe or held by the
United States in trust for the Tribe.”129 The remaining issue was whether
the Crow Tribe could regulate non-member hunting and fishing on the private fee simple land within the Reservation.130
In determining the extent of the Crow Tribe’s ability to regulate hunting and fishing by non-members on reservation fee land, the Court relied on
Oliphant—and, as explored above, its racist underpinnings—for the “general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian Tribe do
not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe.”131 The Court,
however, formulated two exceptions to this general rule. First, tribes retain
the power to regulate non-members who engage in a “consensual relationship[] with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts,
leases, or other arrangements.”132 Second, tribes retain the power to regulate non-member behavior “on fee lands within its reservation when that
conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the
economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.”133 Either of these
exceptions will afford tribal jurisdiction. Here, the Court found that hunting
and fishing failed under both exceptions.134 The hunters did not enter a
consensual relationship with the Crow Tribe, and a lack of control over

2014) (Smith, J., dissenting) (“There is no reason [defendant] should have reasonably anticipated
that . . . it would be subject to the entire—and largely undefined—body of Indian tribal tort law.”);
Angela R. Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 CAL. L. REV. 799, 800 (2007) (explaining the tension between “Indian nations’ inherent right to live and govern beyond the reach of the
dominant society” and those that feel “imposing liberalism onto Indian nations is necessary to
prevent intrusions on individual rights by tribal governments.”).
126. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
127. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 445 (1997).
128. Montana, 450 U.S. at 557.
129. Id. (quoting United States v. Montana, 604 F.2d 1162, 1165-1166 (9th Cir. 1979) rev’d
sub nom. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981)).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 565.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 566.
134. Montana, 450 U.S. at 566
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hunting and fishing would not “threaten the Tribe’s political or economic
security as to justify regulation.”135
Montana left several questions in its wake. While some of the questions have been answered definitively, others linger. As addressed below,
these have included: (1) whether the extent of tribal civil adjudicative jurisdiction parallels the civil regulatory authority that Montana addressed;
(2) the scope of Montana’s second exception; and (3) the significance of
land—i.e., whether Montana applies to non-member conduct on tribally
owned land.
1.

Civil Regulatory versus Adjudicative Jurisdiction

After Montana, some speculated that its holding applied merely to civil
regulatory jurisdiction, rather than civil adjudicative jurisdiction.136 Civil
adjudicative jurisdiction concerns the ability to redress civil claims against
individual defendants.137 Whereas, civil regulatory authority138 concerns
the ability to regulate conduct within a geographic location—land use regulation or taxing authority, for example.139 Strate v. A-1 Contractors, however, laid this speculation to rest.140
In Strate, the Supreme Court considered tribal civil jurisdiction over a
negligence claim resulting from a car accident on a North Dakota state
highway in the Fort Berthold Reservation.141 The Court found that, although located in the Reservation, the state highway was the “equivalent, for
nonmember governance purposes, to alienated, non-Indian land.”142 And
while Strate addressed the Tribe’s civil adjudicative jurisdiction over a tort
claim, as opposed to civil regulatory jurisdiction, the Court still applied
Montana.143 It determined that “[a]s to nonmembers . . . a tribe’s adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed it legislative jurisdiction.”144 Accordingly,

135. Id.
136. See Joseph William Singer, Publicity Rights and the Conflict of Laws: Tribal Court Jurisdiction in the Crazy Horse Case, 41 S.D. L. REV. 1, 27 (1996) (“The ruling in Montana related
to legislative jurisdiction not adjudicative jurisdiction.”).
137. Id. at 28.
138. Civil regulatory jurisdiction is commonly known as “legislative jurisdiction.”
139. Singer, supra note 136, at 27-28.
140. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
141. Id. at 442.
142. Id. at 454.
143. Id. at 453.
144. Id.
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Montana controls for non-member conduct on fee land within a reservation,
whether the jurisdictional question is regulatory or adjudicative.145
2.

Interpretation of Montana’s Second Exception

Unlike the more open and shut question of civil adjudicative versus
regulatory jurisdiction, application of Montana’s second exception146 has
been a continuing source of inconsistency and confusion within the federal
judiciary. Strate is illustrative of where the Supreme Court has taken Montana’s second exception. In applying the first Montana exception, Strate
quickly dismissed the car accident as a nonconsensual act.147 The Court
then provided an extremely narrow interpretation of Montana’s second exception. As explored, Montana’s original second exception language addressed potential infringement upon the “political integrity, the economic
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.”148 If the non-member’s action met this criterion, the tribe could assert civil jurisdiction.149 On its face,
“political integrity, economic security, or the health and welfare of the
tribe” might encompass many behaviors—including a tribe’s ability to address negligent driving.150 Nevertheless, Strate explained that the second
exception isn’t nearly so broad.151 This exception only comes into play
when the non-member’s action threatens the tribe’s ability “to protect tribal
self-government” or control “internal relations.”152 In other words, Montana didn’t really mean what it said.
In the end, the Court found that negligent driving failed to meet Montana’s second exception because “[n]either regulatory nor adjudicatory authority over the state highway accident is needed to preserve the right of
reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.”153 It
reasoned that “those who drive carelessly on a public highway running
through a reservation endanger all in the vicinity, and surely jeopardize the
145. See id. at 459.
146. This Article explores Montana’s second exception, as it is most germane to the Standing Rock Tribe’s potential for jurisdiction over the DAPL—the Standing Rock Tribe would have a
hard time arguing with a straight face that it entered into a consensual relationship with Dakota
Access, LLC. However, rest assured that Montana’s first exception has produced no shortage of
litigation. See, e.g., Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 746 F.3d 176 (5th
Cir. 2014).
147. Strate, 520 U.S. at 457.
148. Montana, 450 U.S. at 544, 566.
149. Id.
150. Strate, 520 U.S. at 459.
151. Id.
152. Id. (quoting Montana).
153. Id. (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959)).

2018]

BLACK SNAKE ON THE PERIPHERY

77

safety of tribal members . . . [b]ut if Montana’s second exception requires
no more, the exception would severely shrink the rule.”154 In reality, by interpreting Montana so narrowly, the Court signals that the second exception
exists only on paper. In fact, the Court has explained in subsequent jurisprudence that the action “must do more than injure the tribe, it must imperil
the subsistence of the tribal community.”155 Thus, at this point, a nonmember action that threatens tribal self-governance may not even suffice.
This narrowness was on full display in Atkinson Trading Company,
Inc. v. Shirley.156 Shirley evaluated the Navajo Nation’s ability to tax a
non-member owned hotel located on fee land within the Navajo Reservation.157 The Court held that the Navajo lacked jurisdiction because the loss
of the Nation’s ability to tax this one hotel would not threaten “or [have]
some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the
health and welfare of the tribe.”158 Montana, the Court explained, gives
“nothing beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to
control internal relations.”159 The Court further stated, “[w]hatever effect
the petitioner’s operation of the [hotel] might have on surrounding Navajo
land, it [did] not endanger the Navajo Nation’s political integrity.”160
Shirley stands in stark contrast to the Court’s prior holding in Merrion
v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, a case that dealt with the Jicarilla Apache Tribe’s
power to tax non-member oil operations on its New Mexico Reservation.161
In affirming the Jicarilla Apache Tribe’s right to issue this tax, the Court
noted:
The power to tax is an essential attribute of Indian sovereignty because it is a necessary instrument of self-government and territorial management. This power enables a tribal government to raise
revenues for its essential services. The power does not derive
solely from the Indian tribe’s power to exclude non-Indians from
tribal lands. Instead, it derives from the Tribe’s general authority,
as sovereign, to control economic activity within its jurisdiction,

154. Id. at 457-58.
155. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 341 (2008)
(emphasis added) (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 566).
156. Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001).
157. Id. at 649.
158. Id. at 656.
159. Id. at 658.
160. Id.
161. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
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and to defray the cost providing governmental services by requiring contributions from persons within its jurisdiction.162
Notably, Merrion did not apply Montana—probably because the tax
took place on tribally owned land, rather than privately owned fee land. Indeed, the difference in land was Shirley’s justification for declining to apply
Merrion to a tax on businesses located on reservation fee land.163
But this difference in land does not explain why Shirley declined to apply Merrion once it reached Montana’s second exception. Merrion clearly
states that the power to tax is essential to tribal self-government.164 If the
“political integrity, economic security, and health and welfare” that Montana references really boils down to tribal self-government, nothing is more
essential to self-government then the power to tax. Yet Shirley’s analysis
was so narrow that, even though the true right at stake was a broad power to
tax non-member business on reservation fee lands, the Court examined the
mere effect of not being able to tax the petitioner’s one business.165 This
analytical singularity, however, could apply to any strand of governmental
sovereignty.
For instance, the Internal Revenue Service’s power to tax is clearly essential to the United States’ ability to self-govern—in terms of both generating revenue and structuring societal behavior.166 Under Shirley’s mode of
analysis, a single taxpayer could argue that the IRS’s essential function is
not so essential as it pertains just to them. And if you accumulate all of the
individual taxpayers who could make this same argument, eventually the
government completely loses its ability to tax. By contrast, Merrion analyzed tribal ability to tax, not as it pertained to one plaintiff, but rather as it
pertained to anyone within the Tribe’s territory. Shirley should have done
the same, and is now representative of just how high the Montana bar has
been set. Because if the power to tax is not enough to meet Montana’s second exception, it is hard to fathom that anything would be.
Lower federal circuit courts, however, are not always perfect in taking
the Supreme Court’s lead. Even though the Supreme Court has been explicit in narrowing Montana’s second exception, federal circuit courts have
been inconsistent in their approach. Some circuit courts continue to apply

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 136 (emphasis added).
Shirley, 532 U.S. at 653-54.
Merrion, 455 U.S. at 136.
See Shirley, 532 U.S. at 656-59.
JOSEPH BANKMAN ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 2-8 (16th ed. 2012).
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the second exception broadly, while others track the High Court and apply
it narrowly—this discrepancy sometimes even occurs within the same circuit.167 The result lends to uncertainty in how a federal court might apply
Montana in addressing tribal jurisdiction over the effects of an oil pipeline.
3. The Importance of Land
As explored above, Montana examined tribal jurisdiction over nonmember conduct on fee land within a reservation, and articulated a general
presumption against such jurisdiction, absent two exceptions.168 But Montana additionally explained that had the hunting and fishing in question occurred “on land belonging to the Tribe or held by the United States in trust
for the Tribe” the Tribe would have retained jurisdiction.169 As a result,
immediately after Montana, tribes would have safely assumed, at the very
least, that they retained the sovereignty to address non-member conduct on
tribal land.
Nevada v. Hicks upended this assumption.170 The petitioner in Hicks
was a member of the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribe, and resided on its Reservation in Nevada.171 The petitioner sued a Nevada state game warden in
tribal court, alleging that the warden had illegally searched his residence.172
In assessing the tribal court’s jurisdiction, the United States Supreme Court
explained that while the cause of action occurred on tribally owned land—
as opposed to private fee land—land status was not dispositive of whether
167. Compare Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc. v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802, 817
(9th Cir. 2011) (holding land lease dispute between tribe and non-member corporation met Montana’s second exception because the business venture “constituted a significant economic interest
for the tribe”), and Attorney’s Process & Investigation Servs., Inc. v. Sac & Fox Tribe of the Mississippi in Iowa, 609 F.3d 927, 939 (8th Cir. 2010) (finding private non-member corporation’s
tortious actions and “seiz[ure] of sensitive information” within tribal casino met Montana’s second exception by “menac[ing] the political integrity, the economic security, and the health and
welfare of the tribe to such a degree that it imperiled the subsistence of the tribal community.”
(internal brackets omitted) (quoting Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 341)), with Fort Yates
Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 4 v. Murphy ex rel. C.M.B., 278 F.3d 663, 665-66, 669-70 (8th Cir. 2015)
(holding that tribe lacked jurisdiction because allegation of breach of public school’s “duty to provide safe learning environment” and negligent hiring practices did not “imperil the subsistence of
the Tribe”), and Evans v. Shoshone-Bannock Land Use Policy Comm’n, 736 F.3d 1298 1306 (9th
Cir. 2013) (holding tribe lacked jurisdiction over construction project that would allegedly cause
groundwater contamination because the project did not “pose[] catastrophic risks”), and MacArthur v. San Juan Cty., 497 F.3d 1057, 1075 (10th Cir. 2007) (explaining that tribal “interest in regulating employment relationships between its members and non-Indian employers on the reservation” did not meet Montana’s second exception).
168. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66.
169. Id. at 557.
170. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
171. Id. at 355-56.
172. Id. at 356-57.
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Montana applied.173 In a marked departure from past caselaw, the Court
found that “[t]he ownership status of land . . . is only one factor to consider
when determining whether regulation of the activities of nonmembers is
‘necessary to protected tribal self-government or to control internal relations.’”174 Moreover, “the existence of tribal ownership is not alone enough
to support regulatory jurisdiction over non-members.”175 The Court applied
Montana and held that “tribal authority to regulate state officers in executing process related to the violation, off reservation, of state laws is not essential to tribal self-government.”176
Still, Hicks left more questions than answers. To start, the case had addressed a narrow circumstance: namely, tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers on tribal land when there is an important competing state interest.
Hicks clearly held that Montana applies in this specific instance. And Hicks
stated explicitly that its holding extended only to the facts in front of the
Court.177 The Court stated, “[o]ur holding in this case is limited to the question of tribal-court jurisdiction over state officers enforcing state law. We
leave open the question of tribal-court jurisdiction over nonmember defendants in general.”178 Both Justice Souter and Justice Ginsburg’s concurring
opinions echoed this exact sentiment.179
The Court, however, has also provided some clues that Hicks may have
broader implications. For example, Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion
proclaimed that the Court “finally resolv[ed] that Montana . . . governs a
tribe’s civil jurisdiction over nonmembers regardless of land ownership.”180
Stronger yet, dicta in Plains Commerce Bank—a case featuring a nonmember action on reservation fee land—explained that Montana “restricts
tribal authority over nonmember activities taking place on the reservation,
and is particularly strong when the nonmembers activity occurs on land
owned in fee simple by non-Indians—what we have called ‘non-Indian fee
land.’”181
Regardless of the language in Plains Commerce Bank, federal circuit
courts are split regarding the significance of land ownership. The Ninth
Circuit has interpreted Hicks as applying only to instances where there is a
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id. at 359-60.
Id. at 360.
Id.
Hicks, 533 U.S. at 364.
Id. at 558.
Id. at 404 n.2.
Id. at 376 (Souter, J., concurring); Id. at 386 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Id. at 387 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 328 (2008).
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competing state interest, and limits Montana to non-member actions occurring off of tribal land.182 Conversely, other circuits now apply Montana to
all actions involving non-members, whether or not it occurs on non-tribal
land.183 Some courts do not even bother to examine where the action took
place and automatically apply Montana if it involves a non-member.184
Hence, the prevailing trend seems to be moving farther and farther away
from Williams v. Lee and the traditional notion that there is “no doubt” regarding tribal jurisdiction over non-member action on tribal land.185
IV. PATHS FOR TRIBAL JURISDICTION OVER THE DAPL
Two potential options have been proposed for the Standing Rock Tribal
Court to gain jurisdiction—either regulatory or adjudicative—over the
DAPL. First, the pipeline crosses through lands north of the current Reservation186 expressly reserved by the Standing Rock Tribe under the 1868 Ft.
Laramie Treaty.187 And although these lands were taken by an 1876
“agreement,” the Supreme Court subsequently declared this an unconstitutional taking and awarded compensation that the Tribe has flatly rejected.188
Accordingly, the Standing Rock Tribe may argue that the pipeline runs
through Sioux territory, thereby providing civil jurisdiction.
Second, the DAPL will cross underneath Lake Oahe, and a substantial
portion of Lake Oahe falls within the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe Reservation.189 The pipeline passes a half-mile north of the Reservation boundary,
and does not physically cross through the Reservation portion of the lake.
But a pipeline crossing underneath a lake located partially on a reservation

182. See Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc. v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802, 813 (9th Cir.
2011) (“Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent, as well as the principal that only Congress
may limit a Tribe’s sovereign authority, suggest that Hicks is best understood as the narrow decision it claims to be . . . Its application of Montana to a jurisdictional question arising on tribal land
should apply only when the specific concerns at issue in that case exist. Because none of those
circumstances exist here, we must follow precedent that limits Montana to cases arising on nonIndian land.”)
183. See Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., Inc. v. Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa
Indians, 807 F.3d 184, 207 (7th Cir. 2015) (explaining that “Montana applies regardless of whether the actions take place on fee or non-fee land”).
184. See, e.g., Belcourt Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Davis, 786 F.3d 653 (8th Cir. 2015); Dolgencorp,
Inc. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 746 F.3d 167 (5th Cir. 2014).
185. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959).
186. See supra Part I.
187. See supra Part I.
188. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 371 (1980); Ostler & Estes, supra note 44.
189. See supra Part I.
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might lead to tribal jurisdiction over any negative future effects. Both arguments will be explored in turn.
A. LANDS TO THE NORTH
The Standing Rock Tribe may have an uphill battle if it attempts to
gain jurisdiction by arguing that the pipeline passes through unceded lands
to the north of the Reservation. This land seems like it meets the definition
of Indian Country, as the Standing Rock Tribe never formally ceded it. The
1876 Agreement was gained through duress and failed to carry the requisite
number of signatures, as mandated for any land cession under the 1868 Ft.
Laramie Treaty.190 Furthermore, the Standing Rock Tribe has never accepted court-awarded compensation for this taking.191 In a sane and just
world, this land is Standing Rock Sioux Territory—albeit now owned in
fee. Alas, federal Indian law is often not sane or just.
In Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, the Supreme Court explored a class claim
by the Kiowa, Apache, and Comanche Tribes arguing that the United States
had taken their land illegally by a fraudulent agreement that lacked the required number of signatures.192 The Tribes contended that the subsequent
federal statute immortalizing the agreement was therefore void.193 The
Court ultimately determined that Congress had plenary authority over tribal
affairs,194 which included the unilateral power to abrogate treaties “in the
interest of the country.”195 In 1986, the Supreme Court re-visited congressional power to abrogate treaties and determined that Congress has this ability as long as its “intentions” are “clear and plain.”196
The federal taking of lands to the north of the Standing Rock Sioux
Tribe Reservation was evil, but it was also a clear congressional abrogation
of past treaty rights. Under federal law, Congress had this plenary authority.197 That the 1876 Agreement failed to carry the correct number of signatures, that it was cemented through coercive tactics, and that it lacked any
semblance of fair consideration was enough for the Supreme Court to deem
the agreement an unconstitutional taking.198 Merely holding that the
190. See supra Part III.B.1.
191. See supra Part III.B.1.
192. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
193. Id. at 563-64.
194. See id. at 565 (“Plenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from the beginning . . . .”).
195. Id. at 566.
196. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 (1986).
197. Id.
198. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371(1980).
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agreement was an illegal taking, however, did not translate into a return of
the land, or the land morphing back to tribal territory. The Tribe’s rejection
of monetary compensation does not change this equation.
B. LAKE OAHE
A second potential route for tribal jurisdiction over the DAPL could
come from the pipeline’s crossing through Lake Oahe, a half-mile upstream
from the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe Reservation. An analysis of this route
will need to differentiate between an attempt for civil regulatory jurisdiction
versus an attempt for civil adjudicative jurisdiction for suits against the Dakota Access, LLC199 individually for monetary damage in the event of an
oil spill.
The civil regulatory course would be nearly impossible. First, the pipeline route does not cross through Standing Rock territory—it passes just to
the north.200 The Standing Rock Tribe would have difficulty gaining regulatory authority over activity that occurs outside of its territory.201 Second,
even if the Standing Rock Tribe could show that the pipeline runs through
actual reservation territory, it would face the additional roadblock of federal
preemption; the ability to grant permits for pipelines to cross federally regulated waters—such as Lake Oahe—falls within the sole province of the
Army Corps of Engineers.202
The more realistic road to tribal jurisdiction would come through civil
adjudicative jurisdiction. Although the pipeline will not cross through the
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe Reservation, it will cross underneath a lake
partly on reservation territory, and any resulting problems with the pipeline—an oil spill, for example—could have disastrous consequences for its

199. If the Standing Rock Tribe attempted to sue the Army Corps of Engineers in tribal
court, it would face the obstacle of sovereign immunity. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW 2005 EDITION 649 (2005) (“The general principle immunizing the United States
from suit without [its] consent extends to suits filed by Indian nations against the United States in
tribal courts . . . .”).
200. See supra Introduction.
201. See Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. King Mountain Tobacco Co., 569 F.3d 932, 938 (9th
Cir. 2009) (explaining that tribal jurisdiction is limited to Indian country) (citing Atkinson Trading
Co., 532 U.S. at 658 n. 12).
202. See supra note 11. However, the Standing Rock Tribe may be able to side-step federal
preemption by arguing that: “(1) the law touches exclusive rights of self-governance in purely intramural matters; (2) the application of the law to the tribe would abrogate rights guaranteed by
Indian treaties; or (3) there is proof by legislative history or some other means that Congress intended the law not to apply to Indians on their reservations.” Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal
Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985) (internal brackets and quotation omitted). Here, the
Standing Rock Tribe may have a legitimate argument under abrogation of treaty rights. But, as
the pipeline does not pass through tribal territory, this argument is largely academic.
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land and water. The Standing Rock Tribe may have a chance of asserting
jurisdiction if anything goes wrong, depending on whether, and how, a federal court applies Montana.
South Dakota v. Bourland is a good place to start in answering this
question.203 Bourland looked at the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe’s regulation of hunting and fishing by non-members on land and water still located
within Reservation boundaries.204 However, the federal government had
acquired this land and water for construction of the Oahe Dam.205 This case
resembled Montana in that the Cheyenne River Tribe was attempting to
regulate non-member hunting and fishing on land within the reservation,
but no longer owned by the Cheyenne River Tribe.206 The Court found that
a tribe’s ability to regulate stems from its power to exclude.207 In this case,
Congress had eliminated the Cheyenne River Tribe’s power to exclude by
taking the land for the Oahe Dam Project “and broadly opening up those
lands for public use,”208 thereby ending “the Tribe’s pre-existing regulatory
control over non-Indian hunting and fishing.”209 The Court noted, however,
that the loss of the right to exclude created just a presumption that the
Cheyenne River Tribe had lost regulatory control, and it remanded the case
for application of Montana’s exceptions.210
The Bourland holding applies to the Standing Rock Tribe’s jurisdiction
over the portion of Lake Oahe that falls on reservation territory. Much like
the section of the Missouri River that the Cheyenne River Tribe attempted
the regulate in Bourland, the Lake Oahe section of the Standing Rock Sioux
Tribe Reservation was taken by Congress for the Oahe Dam project.211
And, even though Bourland dealt with civil regulatory jurisdiction, its holding applies to civil adjudicative jurisdiction because tribal adjudicative authority does not exceed regulatory authority.212 Therefore, under Bourland,
a court would likely apply Montana to the Standing Rock Tribe’s civil ad-

203. South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993).
204. Id. at 681-82.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 688.
207. Id. at 689.
208. Id.
209. Bourland. 508 U.S. at 695.
210. Id. at 695-98. On remand, the Eight Circuit found that tribal ability to regulate hunting
and fishing did not meet either Montana exception. See generally South Dakota v. Bourland, 39
F.3d 868 (8th Cir. 1994).
211. M-Opinion at 8-9.
212. Strate, 520 U.S. at 453.
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judicative jurisdiction over the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe Reservation waters of Lake Oahe.
How a court might apply Montana to the Standing Rock Tribe’s civil
adjudicative authority over the DAPL is unpredictable, and ultimately depends on the proclivities of the specific federal circuit, or even individual
judges within that circuit.213 An oil pipeline is obviously a different matter
than hunting and fishing, both in terms of its potential for environmental calamity, and the ability of the Standing Rock Tribe to address the effects of
an important natural resource. However, under the Supreme Court’s increasingly restrictive application of Montana, the effects of an oil pipeline
may not be enough. If the Court found that the ability to levy taxes was not
essential to tribal self-government,214 it remains doubtful that an oil pipeline
would. Unless the Standing Rock Tribe received a federal circuit court’s
more liberal reading of Montana’s second exception, its claim for jurisdiction would likely fail. This, in and of itself, is enough to signal that Montana’s second exception really is no exception at all. Montana has become
window dressing for the growing assumption within federal courts that
tribes cannot assert jurisdiction over non-members, period.
The potential source of trouble that would occur off-reservation provides another wrinkle. If there were an oil spill, the spill itself would have
originated off of tribal territory, and thus normally would be off limits entirely for tribal jurisdiction.215 In this instance though, the effects of the
spill would potentially occur on the reservation itself, leaving the Standing
Rock Tribe with a strong argument that it could apply its jurisdictional authority.216 This is especially so if the potential oil spill affected the reservation land. Most of the reservation land had not been taken for the Oahe
Dam; therefore, the Standing Rock Tribe retains the right to exclude, and,
theoretically, the inherent right to assert jurisdiction over the conduct of
members and non-members alike. This right would include jurisdiction
over the disastrous effects of an oil spill on Reservation land. As noted
above, however, in the wake of Hicks, the growing trend for federal courts
is to apply Montana regardless of land status.217 Even if the particular action took place on tribal land, this claim would involve a non-member. A

213. See supra Part II.B.
214. Atkinson Trading Co., Inc., 532 U.S. at 658.
215. See supra Part I.
216. See Wisconsin v. E.P.A., 266 F.3d 741, 749 (7th Cir. 2001) (“There is no case that expressly rejects an application of Montana to off-reservation activities that have significant effects
within the reservation . . . .”).
217. See supra Part II.B.3.
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court might just apply Montana, and the chances of success would become
more difficult.
V. CONCLUSION
The Standing Rock Tribe’s best hope of asserting jurisdiction over the
DAPL would come through civil adjudicative jurisdiction over any resulting negative effects. Federal courts have increasingly applied Montana if a
case involves a non-member, regardless of the status of the land, and have
increasingly narrowed Montana’s second exception to the point of nullity.
As such, any claim for tribal jurisdiction over the effects of the DAPL may
be met with Montana, and may ultimately wither under Montana’s extremely steep test. The DAPL, therefore, provides a great demonstration of how
federal courts apply Montana in too many situations, and how its test has
become too onerous. If a tribe cannot assert jurisdiction over the territorial
effects of a nearby pipeline, merely because the pipeline is owned and operated by a non-member, what non-member activity would suffice? The federal judiciary should rewind back to a time when it recognized greater tribal
civil jurisdictional sovereignty.

